Timor link, no. 25, March 1993 by unknown
Resistance leader captured 
xanana Gusmao, 45, leader of the 
Timorese resistance and commander 
of its armed wing, Falintil, was arrested 
on 20 November 1992, having evaded 
the Indonesia military for the last 16 
years. The Indonesian govenunent has 
attempted to use his arrest to weaken 
the political morale of the pro· 
independence movement. 
Gusmao's arrest followed a dawn raid on 
the Dili home of the mother and sister of 
Abilio Araujo, the Fretilin leader based in 
Portugal. In line with regular practice in 
East Timor and Indonesia, he was taken to 
a military detention centre and interrogated. 
Access to a lawyer was denied in 
contravention of Indonesia's own Code of 
Criminal Practice. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross was also denied 
access until · 7 December. The two ICRC 
visitors would not comment afterwards on 
the condition of the prisoner. 
On 24 November, Armandina Gusmao 
and Gilman Exposto, Xanana's sister and 
brother-in-law, along with two of their 
children, were also arrested, giving rise to 
fears that they would be used to exert 
additional pressure on Xanana. 
The arrests were the culmination of an 
intensified campaign by the occupying 
Indonesian forces around the first 
anniversary on 12 November of the 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre. Hundreds of East 
Timorese were detained and interrogated 
and, at the time of writing, it was feared that 
some of the detainees were still in 
incommunicado detention. 
Video pressure 
Xanana was initially taken to Denpasar in 
Bali, before being moved to Jakarta . At the 
beginning of December the Indonesian 
authorities released a video, made by the 
Indonesian army, in which Xanana, 
speaking in Portuguese, recognises that East 
Timor belongs to Indonesia and calls on the 
guerrillas in the mountains to give up the 
struggle. 
The blatantly edited video, in which 
with Jose Abilio 
Osorio Soares, the new governor of East 
Timor, shows a pallid, beaten man, clearly 
under extreme pressure. 
The video was intended to compound the 
desperate sense of demoralisation felt by the 
East Timorese since Xanana's arrest. Xanana 
has been an inspiration to the East Timorese 
since he took over the resistance leadership 
from Nicolau Lobato, who was killed by 
Indonesian forces in 1979. The Indonesian 
military had been hunting for Xanana for 
years and his capture is a great prize. 
According to a recent report in the Jakarta 
Post, the military involved will be rewarded 
with decorations. 
Xanana, along with two other survivors 
of an attack by the Indonesian military in 
1979, had succeeded in regrouping the 
decimated resistance to make it an effective 
guerrilla army again. And in 1989 Xanana 
reorganised the movement internally, 
distancing himself from Fretilin to become 
chairperson of a broader umbrella structure, 
the National Council of Maubere Resistance, 
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which included the UDT as well as Fretilin. 
Most of the time Xanana remained hidden 
in the mountains, coming to Dili 
occasionally, at night and under cover. He 
was interviewed face to face by the foreign 
media only once, in 1990, when Australian 
lawyer Robert Domm reached him in his 
mountain retreat. 
Concern 
Xanana's arrest was greeted with dismay by 
supporters of the Timorese cause across the 
world. Human rights groups like Amnesty 
International called on the Indonesian 
government to allow the ICRC access to all 
Timorese prisoners and to permit immediate 
access to lawyers of their choice in 
accordance with Indonesia 's own criminal 
code. 
The Portuguese government issued a 
statement on 25 November appealing to the 
international community to act without 
delay to 'achieve the freedom and ensure 
the physical integrity of Xanana Gusmao, 
and guarantee that his rights as a human 
being be completely respected by the 
authorities of Indonesia'. 
The International Platform of Jurists for 
SUMMARY 
The first anniversary of the Santa Cruz 
massacre was marked with ceremonies in 
many capital cities around the world. In 
Dili itself, commemorations were muted, as 
the Indonesian military made sure that any 
demonstrative action was firmly suppressed. 
Only a few days later came the shattering 
news of Xanana's arrest. This issue of Timar 
Link looks at these events, and analyses the 
implications of the installation of East 
Timor's new military governor. We report 
on a recent conference of international 
lawyers who met in London in December 
to discuss East Timar, and reveal a new 
wave of repression directed at Church 
personnel inside the territory. 
NEWS FROM EAST TIMOR 
East Timar CIPJET) wrote to the UN 
secretary-general quoting the fourth Geneva 
Convention, which Indonesia ratified in 
March 1961. 'Anyone arrested under 
suspicion of having committed a criminal 
offence,' the letter said, 'is not only 
protected by non-derogable human rights 
but also by the rights provided under the 
Humanitarian Laws of War, including those 
set out in articles 64-76 of the fourth Geneva 
Convention . . . 
'We urge you to monitor his treatment so 
that you can advise all the member states 
who are signatories to the Geneva 
Conventions of any breaches so that they 
can make arrangements to arrest and bring 
to trial those involved in committing these 
breaches. This would be in accordance with 
the practice which members states were 
invited to follow in the case of Iraq's 
occupation of Kuwait (Security Council 
Resolution 674 of 29 October 1990). We 
urge you to bring this matter to the attention 
of the Security Council, where a resolution 
in the appropriate terms could be passed.' 
For its part, CUR appealed to the UN 
secretary-general to intervene personally in 
relation to the arrest ofXanana. 'We are sure 
that you share our concern that the 
Indonesian authorities include East 
Timorese participation in the bilateral talks 
currently taking place between the 
Indonesian and Portuguese governments, 
and that Mr Gusmao's future be seen in this 
context,' the letter said. 
Demoralising effect? 
It is still too early to assess fully the 
consequences of Xanana's arrest for the 
resistance inside East Timar. The pro-
Indonesian press has reported the 
widespread surrender of up to 1,000 
guerrillas. This figure is somewhat at 
variance with the 200 or so guerrillas 
regularly quoted by Indonesian military 
sources as still remaining in the mountains. 
It is likely that many of those 
'surrendering' have been non-armed 
members of pro-independence youth and 
student groups rounded up in the 
November crackdown. They may have been 
forced to sign 'surrender statements' and it 
is feared that some may be made to testify 
under duress against Xanana in what is 
almost bound to be a show trial. 
According to sources in East Timar, the 
detainees are being subjected to ill-
treatment and intimidation. Several East 
Timorese businessmen have gone into 
hiding, as they are suspected of having 
supplied Xanana with his needs in his 
hideout. 
According to the pro-Indonesian paper 
jawa Pos, an East Timorese youth 
organisation, Fitun, used a bizarre oath-
taking ceremony similar to those described 
in the article on pp.7-8 to dissolve itself in 
early December 1992. The youths reportedly 
swore, in the presence of the local military 
commander, Lt Col Syarifudin Zein and 
religious figures and community leaders, to 
disband, not to form a new organisation 
with the same guidelines as Fitun, and to 
join the youth organisations legally 
approved by the government and unified 
state of the Republic of Indonesia based on 
Pancasilia (Indonesia's state ideology) and 
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the 1945 Constitution. However, it is known 
that the Indonesian military set up many of 
these organisations in the first place. 
Torture denials doubted 
General Try Sutrisno, commander of the 
Indonesian armed forces , has denied reports 
that Gusmao was tortured. But Mario 
Carrascalao, who was recently replaced as 
the governor of East Timar (see p .3), did 
not believe him. 'Sorry, but we're not that 
stupid ... I am against Fretilin, but when I 
saw that statement I was ashamed as a 
Timorese. It was an insult to my intelligence 
as a Timorese.' Carrascalao, as reported in 
the Washington Post of 19 December, said 
that the arrest of some of Xanana's close 
relatives had probably put him under 
pressure. 
Timorese refugees, g1vmg their 
impressions recently in Lisbon, were not 
taken in either. Gregorio Henriques, another 
resistance fighter captured by the 
Indonesians in 1978, was also forced to 
'change sides'. He explained Xanana's 
conduct this way: 'It must be so as not to 
endanger his relatives and friends arrested 
at the same time as him, and to not put the 
resistance and his own life at risk . . . To 
resist you have to be alive. If he died he 
would not be able to fight on.' 
For some Timorese, the spirit of Gusmao's 
resistance may live on despite his arrest. 
Donaciano Gomes, also living in Lisbon, 
said: 'The person they captured was Jose 
Alexandre Gusmao, not "Xanana" . Xanana 
is already in the soul, the body and the spirit 
of the Timorese People.' 
In a letter received in Britain at the end 
of November, Timorese exiles living in Bali 
described themselves as 'a little broken-
hearted with the news of Xanana's arrest' 
and fearful of his recantation at the hands 
of the military. But they affirmed their 
confidence that their people would 
continue their struggle under new 
leadership. 
The resistance has apparently chosen Ma 
Honu, who was second in command to 
Xanana, as their new leader. 
Trial opens 
Xanana's trial opened in Dili on 1 February. 
Some reports suggested that he would be 
charged with subversion, which carried the 
death penalty, while others claimed that he 
would be tried under Indonesian criminal 
law, which might spare him death, but 
condemn him to life imprisonment. 
jawa Pos reported on 14 December that 
lawyers from the Indonesian Foundation of 
Legal Aid Institutes and Ikadin, the Bar 
Association, were ready to defend Xanana. 
The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute offered 
its services, which, according to Indonesian 
newspapers, were turned down by Xanana. 
The AFP and AP news agencies reported 
on 5 January that an Indonesian lawyer 
called Sydjono had been appointed to 
represent Xanana - by the Indonesian 
police. 
Xanana 
A censored 
• voice 
'I don't know for certain what 
happened, but for the past seventeen 
years, if any prisoner spoke in the way 
that Xanana has spoken, it happened 
as a result of torture.' 
Bishop Belo, 0 Publico, 4December1992 
The release of the video tape of Xanana's 
recantation was followed by another media 
appearance in early December when 
Xanana Gusmao was shown on Portuguese 
television in an interview with Joao Gabriel, 
a Portuguese journalist based in Jakarta. 
Gabriel was surprised to be allowed to 
see Xanana, but there were around three 
dozen people, including high-ranking 
military officers, present throughout the 
interview. He had been given permission 
to conduct the interview on the basis that 
the Indonesians would be given access to it 
before it was broadcast: he decided to take 
the risk. According to Gabriel, however, the 
Indonesians' attempt to censor the 
interview, presumably hoping to use it as 
propaganda to demoralise the resistance, 
was not successful. Gabriel, interviewed 
about his conversation with Gusmao by 
Adelina Gomes for 0 Publico, affirmed that 
the interview refuted the image propagated 
by the previous video of Xanana speaking 
with Osorio Soares. 
Xanana, asked about his acceptance of 
integration with Indonesia, apparently said: 
'I am replying in a way which, if I were free , 
I would not. ' But this was later deleted, 
along with another eight minutes of film by 
the five Indonesian censors present. 
According to Gabriel, Xanana made every 
attempt not to repeat what had been said at 
the Soares interview and made skillful use 
of 'pregnant pauses' to indicate his lack of 
assent to the remarks he was making. We 
reprint below an extract from the transcript 
of the interview and contrast this with a 
statement he made recently, prior to his 
capture (see box). 
Q: Are you rejecting a past, almost half of 
your life, the principles which you defended 
all these 1 7 years? 
A: I am not a conformist, but I think that 
(hesitation), I think that . .. 
(hesitation), I should agree with the facts . 
Q: Do you agree that, at this stage, 
integration is best for Timor? 
A: Yes, individually . .. (hesitation) . I think 
so, because I have nothing to do any more 
with (silence) . .. with other contexts. 
Q: With regards to Portugal, do you think 
it was and continues to be the guilty part 
in relation to the situation in East Timor? 
A: I excuse myself from answering that 
because it is a question that concerns 
Portugal itself . .. (hesitation). At this time 
I . . . (hesitation) do not hold the same 
EAST TIMOR: Time for change 
Timar, area 7,400 square miles, is one of 
the easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The 
western part of the island formerly a 
Dutch colony, belongs to Indonesia, 
whereas East Timar was for more than 
400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal decolonised East 
Timar whose newly formed political 
parties began discussing options for the 
future - federation with Portugal, 
independence, or integration with 
Indonesia. The Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT) initially favoured the first 
option but then joined a coalition with 
the nationalist liberation movement, 
Fretilin, to demand independence. A 
small third party, Apodeti , was used as a 
vehicle for Indonesian propaganda in 
favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a 
coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to 
intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the 
ensuing civil war, 1,500 people lost their 
lives. By September 1975, however, 
Fretilin was in control of virtually all of 
Portuguese Timar, following the 
defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an 
independent state with radical policies 
and continued to threaten East Timar, 
despite previous assurances that Jakarta 
would respect the right of the East 
Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West 
Timor to journalists and on 7 December 
launched a full-scale invasion of East 
Timar with the knowledge of the United 
States and the encouragement of 
Australia. East Timar was proclaimed the 
'27th province' of Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 
people, a third of the population, have 
died as a result of Indonesian rule. But 
the majority of Timorese have not 
accepted subjugation; Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the 
East Timorese for self-determination and 
an armed resistance movement still 
remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive UN 
resolutions, the international community 
has done little or nothing to implement 
them, given the major economic and 
geopolitical interests of the United States, 
japan and particularly Australia in the 
region. Indonesia's crucial strategic 
location and regional status - it has the 
world's fifth largest population, and large 
reserves of oil and other natural 
resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several 
events have combined to break East 
Timor's isolation and bring its continued 
occupation to international attention. In 
1989 the Pope visited the territory and 
in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, 
still considered the administering 
authority of East Timar by the UN, 
created huge expectations of change. 
To huge disappointment in East Timar, 
the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian 
troops shot dead up to 200 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held 
at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the 
East Timorese capital, for a victim of 
repression. Witnessed by foreign 
journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre 
provided indisputable evidence to the 
outside world of Indonesian atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to 
criticise Indonesia's brutality, injecting 
new impetus into diplomatic eff')rts to 
bring about a solution to East Timor's 
suffering. Since 1983 the UN secretary-
general has been entrusted with the 
achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for 
negotiations, Indonesia faces increased 
pressure to reach a solution with 
Portugal and the East Timorese under the 
auspices of the UN. 
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NEWS FROM EAST TIMOR 
position . . . as when . . . as some time ago 
... I have nothing to do with that. I think 
that Portugal . . . should also reconsider its 
own position (silence) . 
Q: Do you support integration? 
A: Well it depends on Portugal . . . I have 
nothing to do with Portugal. 
Q: Has the resistance in Timar finished? 
A: I cannot say, can I? I cannot say . . . 
Q: But about the appeal you made for the 
members of the Fa/inti/ to surrender, do you 
think that the Indonesian authorities are 
sincere about the amnesty that has been 
promised? 
A: I cannot make any statement on that 
subject . . . (hesitation). I made the appeal, 
now all depends on them. They were not 
fighting for me, they were not fighting for 
me. 
New governor 
appointed 
On 18 September Jose Abilio Osorio 
Soares was inaugurated as the new 
governor of East Timor. He replaced 
Mario Carrascalao, who had completed 
the maximum of two five-year periods 
in the post. TIM KEIL argues that, 
despite appearances, the way Soares 
was installed marks a return to the 
previous Indonesian policy of direct 
appointments. 
Not only did the process by which the new 
appointee was chosen make a nonsense of 
Indonesian claims that East Timar has 
achieved self-determination; it also 
highlighted the failure of Jakarta's attempts 
to re-shape the political landscape of the 
territory to its own ends. With the 
appointment of Abilio Soares, that failure 
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would appear to have led to a change in 
Indonesian strategy. 
'Popular aspirations' 
Whereas previous governors had been 
picked d irectly by Jakarta, on this occasion 
the regional assembly (DPRD) in Dili was 
involved both in the initial short-listing of 
candidates and in the final choice of 
appointee, in accordance with standard 
Indonesian practice . However, given that 
the decisions of the DPRD at each stage 
were subject to central government scrutiny 
and approval, the change was more one of 
form than of substance. 
As the commander of the East Timor 
Operations Execution Command 
(Kolakops), Brig-Gen Theo Syafei, pointed 
out, Indonesian law stipulated that the 
candidate with the least number of votes in 
the DPRD's gubernatorial poll could 
become governor if he was deemed best 
able to represent the President and the 
interests of the central government. Abilio 
Soares himself said that he and his 
colleagues in East Timar left the choice of 
the best person for the job entirely to the 
central government. 
In the event, Soares won an 
overwhelming number of votes in the 
assembly, but it was doubtful whether his 
victory reflected 'popular aspirations', as 
claimed by Indonesian officialdom. The 
chairman of the DPRD in Dili, Antonio 
Freitas Parada, said that the assembly had 
sounded out public opinion in making its 
initial selection of candidates but failed to 
mention that, as part of the process, the 
Kolakops had submitted their own list of 
four candidates for consideration by the 
DPRD. 
It was dear whose aspirations the new 
governor really represented when, 
following the assembly's final vote, Theo 
Syafei acknowledged to journalists that 
Soares had been readied for the job by the 
army. 
The most important conduit for 'popular 
aspirations' in East Timor, the Catholic 
Church, appeared to have little or no 
opportunity to make its views known. 
General Syafei had told Bishop Carlos 
Ximenes Belo that, as the Vatican's 
representative in East Timor, he should 
ensure that the diocesan authorities in Dili 
should not comment on the selection of a 
new governor, as this could be construed 
as interference in Indonesia 's internal affairs . 
Enduring political divisions 
The appointment of Abilio Soares, a 
founding member in 1974 of the diminutive, 
pro-integration, Timorese Popular 
Democratic Association (Apodeti), appears 
to mark a shift in Indonesian strategy in East 
Timor. 
In the first few years of Indonesian rule, 
Apodeti members were favoured with 
numerous bureaucratic sinecures and the 
first two governors were from the group's 
ranks. The appointment of Mario 
Carrascalao as governor in 1982, however, 
indicated that the Indorl.esian government 
was turning instead towards former 
members of the Timorese Democratic Union 
(UDU, of which Carrascalao was a founder 
4 
and which had stood for an independent 
East Timor before some of its members 
opted for integration with Indonesia late in 
1975. 
Under Carrascalao, people from the ranks 
of both the UDT and Fretilin, who were 
better educated and more experienced in 
administration (from the days of Portuguese 
rule) than their Apodeti rivals, won 
advancement as Indonesia sought to 
improve the quality of the territory's 
administration and to present a better image 
of an 'integrated' East Timor to the outside 
world. 
This approach has not paid dividends for 
the Indonesians and 16 years of 'integration' 
have failed to break down the political 
divisions created in East Timor in 1974-75. 
Indeed, attempts to draw into the 
Indonesian fold those who had opposed 
integration have succeeded only in 
importing these divisions into the regional 
administration and in giving supporters of 
independence the opportunity to 
undermine Indonesian rule from within. 
Carrascalao apparently grew impatient 
with East Timor's enduring political 
antagonisms and, while committed to 
integration, chafed at the bit of military 
domination and bureaucratic obstruction-
ism. He made no secret of his frustration. 
'Two-headed people' 
Whereas the appointment of Carrascalao 
stemmed in part from concern over the 
standard of civil administration in East 
Timor, the selection of Abilio Soares is a 
purely political move and marks a return to 
the pre-1982 days of strictly figurehead 
governors. 
Soares' immediate task is to legitimise the 
purge of the regional administration 
instigated by the military authorities and 
targeting what Theo Syafei calls 'two-
headed people' - those who enjoy the 
benefits of civil service posts but 
simultaneously agitate against Indonesian 
rule . Plaris for a shake-up of provincial 
government offices, to be handled by the 
vice-governor (a Javanese colonel) and the 
regional secretariat, are already being made. 
Also, the long-standing policy of speeding 
up the retirement of incompetent East 
Timorese government employees is being 
abandoned, a move likely to favour Apodeti 
loyalists still occupying posts in the 
administration and to slow the recruitment 
of young East Timorese graduates and 
school-leavers, whose allegiance to the 
Indonesian state is still in doubt. 
Soares, a dose friend of President 
Suharto's son-in-law, Lt Col Prabowo 
Djojohadikusumo, and dubbed the 'red and 
white governor' after the colours of the 
Indonesian flag , is undoubtedly one-
headed. Though he has spoken of informal 
negotiations between East Timor's opposing 
forces , he insists on all sides accepting 
integration. 
The bitter legacy of the territory's internal 
conflict in 1975 (when Fretilin held him 
captive and executed his brother Jose, then 
secretary-general of Apodeti), also means 
that he is unlikely to be well-disposed 
towards his old foes . This would suit 
Indonesia's military hardliners, who say that 
they will countenance neither truce nor talks 
with the resistance. 
Whereas the first year of Mario 
Carrascalao's governorship saw a ceasefire 
and negotiations between the Indonesian 
army and Fretilin, his successor appears to 
have been appointed with different purpose 
in mind. 
Tight security for massacre 
• anniversary 
Security was tightened in East Timor from 
October onwards in anticipation of the first 
anniversary of the Santa Cruz Massacre. 
Large numbers of East Timorese were 
reportedly picked up by the military if their 
ID card revealed they were not in their 
designated district, or if their ID cards were 
missing. 
On 6 November, Amnesty International 
was refused permission to visit the territory, 
the Indonesian authorities saying that such 
a visit 'would create problems for the 
Timorese people'. A delegation of Australian 
parliamentarians had also been refused 
entry. 
Indonesia's refusal to admit Amnesty flew 
in the face of its undertaking at last year's 
session of the UN Human Rights 
Commission to facilitate access to East Timor 
to human rights organisations. 
However, permission was granted on 9 
November for Mr William Treat, a member 
of the UN Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights, for a two-day visit. 
In Dili mourners were allowed to scatter 
flowers on the graves of the dead in Santa 
Cruz cemetery, having first registered with 
village chiefs, but high security made any 
other activity impossible. 
In Britain's House of Commons a cross-
party early day motion was tabled 
expressing concern at the level of security 
in East Timor and calling for greater access 
to the territory (see International Round-
Up). 
For its part, the Portuguese government 
issued a statement which listed the advances 
which Lisbon claimed the Timorese cause 
had made since the Santa Cruz massacre. 
The latter had made world headlines and 
'awoken the conscience of the world'. 
Portugal highlighted the changes in position 
of the EC, the suspension of US military 
training aid to Indonesia, the UN Human 
Rights Commission's discussions, and a 
number of resolutions passed by 
international organisations and movements. 
Lisbon's statement went on to lament the 
lack of real impact this had had for the 
people of East Timar, and the fact that 
human rights organisations were still not 
allowed to enter. It called on the 
international community to stand by its 
principles of human dignity and 
sovereignty. 'It is imperative to find a 
negotiated and peaceful solution which 
allows for the implementation of the 
decolonisation process. . . in full 
observance of its [East Timor's] cultural and 
religious identity and the legitimate rights 
of its people. This includes the freedom of 
choice of its political destiny, in accordance 
with the United Nations charter and the 
resolutions adopted by the Assembly 
General and the Security Council on this 
question'. 
In the United States the Boston Globe of 
18 November carried an editorial 
remembering the anniversary. It affirmed 
that the United States had 'a special 
obligation to insist that Suharto honour the 
United Nations' repeated calls for Timorese 
self-determination'. 
UN talks: little 
progress 
In December the new Portuguese foreign 
minister, Durrao Barroso took part in the 
second round of UN-sponsored talks to take 
place with Indonesia in 1992. He referred 
to the talks as 'three-way' rather than 
two-way, as Portugal sees the role of the 
UN secretary-general in the settlement of the 
East Timor dispute as crucial. 
The arrest of Xanana Gusmao made the 
negotiations all the more sensitive: Jose 
Ramos Horta, the external representative of 
the East Timorese resistance, had called for 
'total diplomatic confrontation' with 
Indonesia and for Portugal to abandon the 
talks if Indonesia did not 'act in good faith'. 
The talks took place on 17 December with 
the two foreign ministers having separate 
meetings with UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali before meeting 
together. 
Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas, 
described the talks as 'constructive', but 
admitted that the positions of the two 
countries were diametrically opposed. 
Barroso said they were 'very frank, very 
long, but there was no progress', with 
Indonesia continuing to block discussion 
of the possibility of a referendum being in 
East Timor to settle the territory's status. 
Despite the lack of progress, the ministers 
agreed to meet again with the UN secretary-
general in Rome on 20 April. But it is hard 
to see how this process can produce results, 
and other approaches are being discussed 
by all sides. Ali Alatas is said to favour 
settling the issue through a vote at the UN, 
while General Syafei, East Timer's military 
commander, is reported to have said that the 
talks should be called off and the Vatican 
brought in as a mediator. However, the 
Vatican has no formal diplomatic standing 
in the discussions as they have been 
conducted so far. 
The fact that the next talks will be in 
Rome may facilitate church involvement, 
Reebok Award 
for prisoner 
Fernando de Araujo, currently serving a 
nine-year prison sentence in Indonesia for 
his work for human rights in East Timor, is 
one of four people to receive the annual 
Reebok Prize for human rights. The Reebok 
Foundation described him as 'working in 
an environment of repression, intimidation 
and fear' and acting as an invaluable source 
of information of human rights abuses for 
international human rights groups'. He was 
awarded his prize, a cheque for US$25,000 
for his organisation, in absentia. 
The Reebok Foundation said the award 
'recognises people on the front lines of 
human rights work who, early in their lives 
although Jose Ramos Horta has been 
assured that the reason they are taking place 
there is entirely because it suits the diary of 
Boutros Boutros Ghali. Durrao Barroso's 
hopes of progress at these talks remain low 
'because Indonesia is refusing to budge'. 
International 
lawyers' 
conference 
An international conference, organised 
by the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations ( CIIR) and the 
International Platform of Jurists for 
East Timor (IPJET), gathered together 
some 80 lawyers and East Timor 
activists from around the world on 5-6 
December to discuss Indonesia's 
occupation of East Timor from the 
standpoint of international law. IPJET 
general secretary, PEDRO PINTO LEITE, 
assesses the weekend's discussions. 
Held at London's Law Society, the 
conference, as well as being aimed at British 
jurists, was also attended by representatives 
from Australia, Belgium, Colombia, East 
Timor, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kashmir, Macau, Namibia, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Puerto Rico, South 
Korea and the United States. 
The international nature of the conference 
- 'Indonesia'a Occupation of East Timor: 
Legal Questions' - was borne out by the 
fact seven of the speakers and discussants, 
all members of IPJET, were from the 
countries named above. They considered a 
wide range of legal questions concerning 
East Timer's occupation. 
Systematic abuses 
Professor Roger Clark of the Rutgers Law 
School in the United States presented an 
overview of the occupation. 'Human rights 
DIPLOMATIC 
and against great odds, have significantly 
improved the human rights conditions of the 
people in their communities'. 
Constancio 
Pinto escapes 
Constancio Pinto, an East Timorese activist 
who was a leading organiser of the 
demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991 
which preceded the Santa Cruz massacre, 
escaped from Indonesia and reached Macao 
in October 1992. He is now based in Lisbon, 
where he has been joining with human 
rights groups in their solidarity activities. 
violations,' he said, 'are, in a sense, matters 
of detail. The whole system of Indonesia's 
presence is illegitimate. . . The real 
gravamen of the case against Indonesia is 
in the arguments based on self-
determination and on aggression.' 
Lauri Hannikainen of the University of 
Lapland, Finland, demonstrated how the 
rules of ]us Cogens were violated by that 
aggression and occupation, and concluded: 
'All law-abiding states should help, 
encourage and pressure the United Nations 
to react with consistency to gross violations 
of peremptory and other basic principles 
and norms of international law.' 
This informative session was followed by 
animated discussion from the floor. 
A paper by Professor Garth Nettheim of 
the University of New South Wales, Australia 
- read, in his absence, by Michael Ellman, 
vice-president of the International 
Federation of Human Rights - analysed in 
detail the gross human rights violations 
committed by Indonesia in East Timor. 
Nettheim made clear his 'hope for an end 
to the policy of military repression, 
restoration of civil and political rights, and 
some form of movement towards a political 
solution. For without a political solution, the 
horrors of the past 17 years seem certain to 
continue.' 
Meanwhile, a paper by Daniel Machover, 
a solicitor from London, called for the 
application of international humanitarian 
law in the case of Indonesia's occupation 
of East Timor. 
Professor Fran~ois Rigaux of the 
University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 
Susan Marks of Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, and Shambhu Chopra, 
president of the Indian Society of Human 
Rights, made comparative analyses between 
East Timor and the cases of Western Sahara, 
Kuwait and Goa respectively. The audience 
was reminded that the first two cases 
(particularly Western Sahara) were very 
similar to East Timor and that accordingly, 
for the sake of legal and political coherence, 
the solutions (holding of a referendum, 
sanctions against the aggressor) should also 
be similar. 
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The case against Australia 
The next two sessions dealt with the 
substantive issues and the procedural 
aspects of the East Timor case filed by 
Portugal against Australia before the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague 
(ICJ). Ana Gomes, second secretary of the 
Portuguese embassy in London, and Peter 
Zoller of the Australian High Commission 
in London, introduced the position of their 
countries in the case . 
Professor Roger Clark strongly criticised 
the Australian position and concluded: 
·There is a considerable body of state 
practice . . . to the effect that recognition 
should not be granted to the acquisition of 
territory obtained by illegal force .' 
Gerry Simpson of the University of 
Melbourne, Australia, focused on the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ; in other words, 
how the court had dealt with the issues at 
stake in the case of East Timar in previous 
cases: 'It seems that East Timor's right to 
self-determination is unassailable. The ICJ 
is obliged to encourage its implementation 
and should not regard the political 
sensitivity of this issue as an impediment to 
affirming this right,' he said. 
Iain Scobbie of the University of Dundee 
analysed the possible procedural 
implications of Indonesia's absence and 
came to a promising conclusion: 'Given the 
unfolding of the Court's jurisprudence on 
cases which implicate third state interests, 
it would appear that any involvement which 
Indonesia might have in the case cannot 
prevent the Court proceeding to 
determination of the merits.' 
Finally, Christine Chinkin of the 
University of Sydney, Australia , expressed 
in her paper the feelings of the conference: 
'It is hard to escape the conclusion that 
expediency and the desire to have a share 
in the maritime resources of the territory 
have fashioned Australia's position on East 
Timor rather than principled application of 
norms of international law'. 
Self-determination: A legal right 
The second day of the conference opened 
with a session on the right to self-
determination of the East Timorese, the very 
heart of the issue. Professor Paula 
Escarameia of the Institute of Social and 
Political Sciences, Lisbon, adopted a 
theoretical but clear approach to the 
implications for the East Timor issue of the 
absence of a well-developed and properly 
defined legal concept of self-determination. 
The significiance of the absence of such a 
concept was borne out by her short and 
metaphorical assertion: 'It was partly due to 
our legal vocabulary that a genocide was 
committed in East Timor.' 
Bill Bowring of the University of East 
London then examined the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ in relation to self-determination 
and concluded that the principles 
developed by the Court were of direct 
application in the case of East Timor. The 
fmal speaker, Sasha Stepan, an attorney 
from Melbourne, Australia, made a powerful 
plea for the right of self-determination of the 
East Timorese and strongly criticised 
Australian policy on the issue. She was the 
fourth Australian jurist at the conference to 
criticise her own government. 
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The conference ended by linking the legal 
reflections of the previous sessions with 
future political action. Chaired by Ian 
Linden, CIIR's general secretary, the 
session's panel included Barbedo de 
Magalhaes of Porto University, Peter Carey 
of Trinity College, Oxford , John Taylor of 
the South Bank University, Jose Ramos 
Horta, special representative of the Council 
of Resistance of the Maubere People, Carmel 
Budiardjo of Tapol, and myself, as IPJET 
general secretary. All the speakers stressed 
that legal argumentation was a weapon of 
paramount importance in the political 
struggle for a just solution for the problem. 
British arms 
It is believed by many human rights groups 
that British Aerospace has concluded its 
deal to sell 24 Hawk aircraft to Indonesia 
and that a second deal was signed at the end 
of the January. It still refuses to confirm this. 
Indonesia has announced that it intends to 
purchase 144 of the aircraft, enough for six 
squadrons. In view of the deal's sensitivity, 
it is believed that it has been concluded 
without announcement in order to avoid 
an outcry. It has also come to light that 12 
Indonesian pilots and mechanics have 
received intensive training in the use of the 
Hawk in Britain. The six squadrons of 
aircraft will cost Indonesia US$1.5billion, 
making Britain Indonesia's largest arms 
supplier. 
The Hawk aircraft, while not a 'strike 
aircraft', may be used for reconnaissance 
and to provide close cover for troops. The 
Indonesian forces are conducting 
operations against armed resistance in Aceh 
and North Sumatra as well as East Timar. 
Reconnaissance equipment will therefore 
be necessary. 
In the House of Commons on 12 January 
Alice Mahon MP (Labour) asked the 
government to confirm the sale and whether 
he felt any shame that 'despite the lessons 
of the Gulf, the British Government is 
continuing to sell arms to a murderous 
dictator'. But Minister of State for the Armed 
Forces, Archie Hamilton, refused to 
elaborate on contacts between the two 
countries' defence ministries and replied: 
'The point of selling Hawk aircraft to 
Indonesia is to give jobs to people in this 
country. There is no doubt in my mind that 
a Hawk aircraft can do nothing to suppress 
the people of East Timar. The aircraft is not 
suitable for the purpose, and we have 
guarantees from the Indonesians that the 
aircraft would not be used for internal 
suppression' . 
Supporters of the East Tim or cause in both 
houses of parliament kept up a constant 
stream of questions to the government 
between October and December. They were 
invariably met with minimal and evasive 
replies. 
As far as questions regarding aid and trade 
were concerned, the stock response was 
that 'the best way to influence human rights 
policy in Indonesia is by staying in there and 
maintaining our trade, and by discussing 
with them the matters on which we 
disagree, especially bearing in mind that in 
the first six months of this year we had £170 
million of trade with Indonesia, which is 
double last year's amount' . (Minister of State 
Hon. Mark Lennox-Boyd replying to Labour 
MP John Battle on 28 October). 
Alice Mahon asked the Prime Minister on 
5 November if the government would ask 
the Indonesian government to stop 
repressive actions in East Timor around the 
12 November massacre. The reply: 'The 
Indonesians are already fully aware of of the 
views of the British government and of our 
European community partners.' Again on 9 
November she asked Prime Minister John 
Major if he would review the government's 
opposition to an arms embargo against 
Indonesia. His answer: 'No I do not believe 
a review is necessary.' 
Jim Cousins MP (Labour) asked Foreign 
Office minister Alastair Goodlad 'what steps 
he had taken as chairman to refer the 
question of human rights in East Timor to 
the European Foreign Affairs Council'. The 
reply: 'None. European Community 
ministers have considered and expressed a 
view on this subject, most recently in the 
presidency's statement to the 47th session 
of the UN General Assembly'. 
Overseas development minister, Baroness 
Chalker, also came under pressure in the 
House of Lords on 9 and 12 December when 
Labour Lords Rea, Judd and Archer asked 
him to account for Britain's lack of pressure 
on the Indonesian government in relation 
to its human rights record. She emphasised 
the government's view that Indonesia's 
human rights record was improving, but 
remarked: 'We shall continue to work . . . 
and to make sure that they realise that no 
torture is acceptable, no genocide is 
acceptable and that none of the reports that 
we have been reading should ever have any 
foundation, although we believe that some 
of the reports may be exaggerated.' 
Baroness Chalker went on to disassociate 
arms sales with human rights abuses. 'The 
problem that exists in Aceh and the 
problems generally which exist with regard 
to human rights in Indonesia are not in any 
way related to Indonesia's determination to 
buy arms - not necessarily from this 
country but in order to have its own defence 
force' . She concluded: 'We shall do all we 
can to decrease arms sales.' The Hawk deal 
seems a strange way to begin. 
A petition containing over 300 signatures 
urging the British government to end arms 
sales was sent to the Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd in December. The signatures 
were gathered at CIIR's stall at the 'Global 
Partnership' Christmas Market, held in 
London in November. 
Clinton hopes 
Hopes are said to be running high among 
members of Fretilin that President Bill 
Clinton will press Jakarta for East Timor's 
self-determination. Resistance representa-
tive Jose Ramos Horta spoke of his 
confidence that 'with a Clinton 
administration, the Americans will detach 
themselves from the current military 
dictatorships in Indonesia and will move 
more aggressively in support of 
independence in East Timor'. 
One of President Clinton's election 
campaign promises was 'to make American 
foreign policy focus more on humane values 
and democracy.' 
Before the US Congress adjourned in 
October 1992, it gave final approval to an 
amendment co-authored by Republican 
senator Tony Hall which cut US$2.3 million 
from the foreign aid bill in military aid to 
Indonesia for the 1993 fiscal year. (See also 
Timar Link No.24 p.7). The amendment 
cited Indonesia's pattern of abuses against 
the East Timorese. It was the first time that 
Congress had cut aid to Indonesia because 
of East Timor. 
An editorial in the Washington Post of 5 
December accused Indonesia of competing 
for the title of Asia's leading colonial power. 
It drew attention to the regime's 
mistreatment of Xanana Gusmao and 
suggested that 'a wise Indonesian 
government would deal with Mr Gusmao 
in a political process. Short of that it would 
ensure him due process.' The editorial 
referred to the UN talks as a format for 
Indonesia to 'let East Timor choose its 
future' . 
Eminent persons appeal to UN 
More than 50 eminent church leaders, 
politicians and academics signed a joint 
statement on East Timor calling on the UN 
secretary-general and the international 
community for renewed action to end 
human rights violations in East Timor. The 
statement, signed among others by Bishop 
Desmond Tutu, was handed in to the UN 
immediately before the talks between 
Portugal and Indonesia in New York on 17 
December. 
The statement was to gather further 
signatories for the current session of UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The 
signatories commit themselves to 'doing 
everything in our power to ensure that the 
people of East Timor will be guaranteed the 
right to life, the right to peace, and the right 
to justice, which is their entitlement'. 
European Parliament resolution 
The European Parliament passed a 
resolution on 17 December calling for 
representatives of the UN Committee on 
Human Rights (which oversees 
·implementation of UN human rights 
treaties) and Amnesty International to be 
given immediate access to East Timor and 
to Indonesian prisons. The resolution also 
warned Indonesia that repeated violations 
of human rights and international law might 
damage relations with the EC. 
UN human rights workshop in Jakarta 
A workshop on human rights in the Asia 
Pacific region was held in Jakarta on 26-28 
January by the UN Centre for Human Rights 
in collaboration with the Indonesian 
government. The workshop had originally 
been scheduled for December 1991, but had 
been cancelled following the Santa Cruz 
massacre. 
Human rights groups, many of which, like 
Asia Watch, had not been invited, protested 
at the holding of the workshop in Indonesia 
to the Indonesian government. It was seen 
as an attempt by Jakarta to make a name for 
itself on the human rights scene - an 
Indonesian has just been made a vice 
chairperson of the UN Human Rights 
Commission - and Indonesia made a 
special point of inv1tmg Amnesty 
International, which has been banned from 
Indonesia for the past fifteen years. Some 
attendees felt that the meeting was intended 
by at least some Asian governments, not 
least the hosts, as a substitute for the stalled 
Asia regional preparatory meeting for the 
World Conference on Human Rights. 
The conference gave President Suharto a 
further opportunity to reiterate Indonesia's 
position that the obligations of individuals 
towards society and the state should be 
equal to the responsibilities of the state in 
terms of individual human rights, and that 
'international cooperation pre-supposes as 
a basic condition respect for the sovereignty 
of states and national identity of people'. 
Oil companies line up 
Seven of the world's largest oil companies 
INTERNATIONAL 
are preparing to invest large sums of money 
in the exploration of the Timor Gap between 
Australia and Indonesia. The treaty 
permitting the drilling, which was 
concluded between the Indonesian and 
Australian governments in 1989 is, however, 
being contested by Portugal at the 
International Court of Justice. 
In December Lisbon presented to the 
court the final papers of its case against the 
Australian government. Australia has until 
late 1993 to submit its case against Portugal, 
after which a hearing date will be set, 
probably in 1994. 
Oil analysts estimate that output from the 
area could reach 200,000 barrels per day by 
1995. Eleven exploration contracts have 
been awarded, and 45 wells will be drilled 
at an estimated cost of US$345 million. 
USX Marathon oil was the first to start 
drilling on 7 December. It holds a 70 per 
cent stake in a well , while Australia's Santos 
Ltd and Korea Petroleum each have 15 per 
cent. It is thought that in 1993 more 
companies will start drilling, among them, 
Phillips Petroleum Company, Woodside 
Petroleum Ltd, Petroz NL, Enterprise Oil PLC 
and Royal Dutch Shell. 
Eyewitness account 
E.M. visited East Timor recently. He 
writes under a pseudonym to preserve 
his identity and for security reasons is 
unable to name anyone he met. 
Arriving in Dili, you gain a sense of how cut 
off East Timor is, its isolation compounded 
by an apparent atmosphere of lazy calm. 
But as you walk the streets, soldiers pick 
you out with their eyes as you walk. No 
sooner have you escaped the inspection of 
one military gaze, you are captured by 
another. 
The army seems to outnumber people 
on the street. Soldiers are the only ones who 
can walk erect, boldly for all to see. As an 
outsider with previous knowledge of the 
situation in East Timor, you can only guess 
where the East Timorese are, huddled in 
their homes, planning, keeping the fires 
burning so that one day they will be free. 
From the voices that are willing to speak 
to you, you learn that people are frightened. 
So many people have disappeared and the 
November 1991 massacre at Santa Cruz has 
shaken everyone. The army remains 
undefeated and its added column of spies 
apparently outnumber each East Timorese 
family two to one. 
Here oppression has a darker, hidden 
meaning. It is the silences that speak of the 
blood and pain of struggle. Romantically, 
East Timorese activists in the outside world 
may want to hear of defiance, struggle and 
victories. But while such resistance exists, it 
is not immediately apparent in everyday life; 
the smoky heat seems laced with terror and 
silence. 
Walking the streets of Dili, in the wide 
open spaces, the large roads clear for the 
trucks, you feel you are walking in the 
footsteps of the dead - the 200,000 
Timorese who have been killed for wanting 
to be free and who have left the streets of 
Dili with their shadows and ghosts. 
Despite its beauty and calm, it is a fearful 
place. There is a poignant sense of 
unnaturalness screaming in the background. 
On the streets people are too frightened to 
talk to you; talking to you means a visit from 
the army. I remember the face running away 
scared as I asked for directions. Those who 
do speak to you could be spies ready to trap 
you. Walking along the water's edge, the 
tranquil fishing boats are under the mighty 
presence of the military ships with their 
guns pointed inwards towards the bay. 
Resistance in East Timor would appear 
not to provide the firework displays against 
oppression that our television screens show 
of the struggle taking place in South Africa 
or Palestine. Yet in the unremarkableness 
of everyday life, you get the feeling that 
something remarkable is taking place. 
Behind their silent, calm exterior and the 
iron curtain of surveillance, people are 
working clandestinely and dreaming of 
freedom. 
When you ask them about their lives, they 
think you want to hear something 
spectacular - tales of brutal repression or 
of banners for freedom being unfurled every 
day in full view of the world. They forget 
to tell you of the humiliating daily reality of 
checkpoints, of the passes everyone has to 
carry, of how they are registered and 
counted as they enter or leave every village 
and town. Only after questions do they talk 
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about the rapes by soldiers and the babies 
born or women being taken away for service 
from husbands and children. To defend and 
protect themselves the East Timor 
desperately need our solidarity. 
Towns and villages seem like islands 
among a sea of soldiers. Soldiers are in 
doorways, in shops, strutting the streets, at 
bus stations and on the buses. Always 
armed, they dominate the people into 
silence. 
But the voices that are brave enough to 
trust and speak to an outsider, tell of what 
lies behind that silence. They talk of the 
East Timorese people's need for the world 
to devote proper attention to their continued 
suffering. The Santa Cruz massacre has 
shown them that they are still killed in spite 
of the presence of the world's cameras, and 
that, notwithstanding a momentary 
expression of disgruntlement, the world 
seems to carry on as before. How much 
more suffering can they endure when when 
the outside world does not seem to notice it? 
Since Xanana Gusmao's arrest the 
Timorese feel it is up to the international 
community to draw attention to his plight 
during his trial. For the East Timorese, 
Xanana should be a focus of attention just 
as Nelson Mandela was in South Africa. But 
this is now up to us . 
People spoke of the military acumen of 
the new Falantil leader Ma'huno Bukar. 
There was knowledge of three military 
actions by the fighters , with many 
Indonesian army casualties. People said that 
the resistance was 'alive and kicking' and 
giving Timorese people hope. 
People said that the situation now was in 
some ways worse than in the past. In the 
past, repression had been explicit, brutal 
and bloody and had cost thousands of lives. 
Now it was more insidious, but no less 
pervasive. People are being stifled. Their 
language and culture is being taken over, 
replaced in schools by those of Indonesia. 
Thousands of transmigrants are being 
encouraged to work and live in East Timor, 
in a move which is no different from the 
oppressive settlement policies of the Israeli 
government. 
Most shops are owned by these 
newcomers, ensuring that Timorese money 
goes elsewhere. The settlers come from 
Flores, Sulewesi and Bali, pawns to the 
Indonesian leadership's policy of 
annexation. Whole villages are transplanted 
with new facilities; tin roofs and artificial 
streets break the Timorese traditional 
understanding of the land of which they 
form part. 
In a darkened room, with fear of soldiers 
outside, I spoke to two just released from 
imprisonment without trial. They had been 
tied upside down and tortured. Their release 
came only after they had made a confession 
and sworn an oath of allegiance to the 
Indonesian government. They told how 
Timorese traditional beliefs had been 
manipulated and used as a new 
psychological weapon. Blood is taken by 
syringe from Timorese under arrest and 
mixed with wine. They are then forced to 
drink the mixture and make an oath. 
Traditionally, the breaking of such a bond 
between tribes results in death. The two 
8 
former prisoners intended to fight on 
despite the threat of death. 
Throughout East Timor people were 
being rounded up randomly- in Viqueque, 
Baucau, Manatuto, Same. The Indonesian 
government sought to present this as proof 
that people were surrendering and that the 
resistance was broken, in a further effort to 
further demoralise the Timorese and lie to 
the world. 
The people that did speak, were telling 
the world to do something. But as the major 
international powers push for United 
Nations action on Iraq, Indonesia is being 
allowed to silence systematically East Timor. 
As I left East Timor, I felt as if I was in a 
corridor between two worlds, that I was 
carrying the East Timorese people's story 
away. I felt for for all the exiles who could 
not go home. 
New Church 
clampdown 
Latest reports indicate that the Church 
and specifically priests are being 
targeted in a new clampdown by the 
Indonesian military. The military is 
attempting to discredit the leadership 
of priests among the people and to 
drive a wedge between the Church and 
the people. 
Missionaries in the Baucau area were given 
an ultimatum either to leave East Timor or 
take on Indonesian citizenship. Their 
residence permits will not be extended, 
since they have been accused of having 
masterminded confrontations. Among the 
missionaries, Fr Locatelli SDB, Fr Joao de 
Deus SDB and Fr Baltazar are obliged to 
report daily to the armed forces or to Baucau 
District military command. 
Belo disbelieves military 
In a telephone interview conducted by 0 
Publico, published on 4 December 1992, 
Bishop Belo was in no doubt as to what he 
felt had happened to Xanana after his arrest 
in November. Asked whether he thought 
Xanana was telling the truth, or lying in his 
video statement, Belo said: 'I don't know for 
certain what happened, but for the past 17 
years, if any prisoner spoke in the way that 
Xanana has spoken, it happened as a result 
of torture.' 
Disinformation 
Belo went on to reveal his anger at 
disinformation being spread by the military 
about a pastoral letter he was supposedly 
going to release, calling on the guerrillas to 
give up their arms at seven selected 
churches. 'It's quite false . This was cooked 
up by the military so that the people would 
believe it. There is nothing whatsoever 
about any church being specified for this. I 
have not yet taken the decision on whether 
to issue a Christmas pastoral letter. It's all 
lies. It's all military propaganda.' 
He confirmed that he would not make 
any appeal to the guerrillas, as he feared 
that they would be killed if they gave 
themselves up, as in 1979 and 1980. He 
would only relent if he was given guarantees 
that 'anyone who surrenders will not be 
tortured, will not be killed, will not 
disappear' . He did not believe that with 
Xanana's capture, the resistance would 
disappear: 'Xanana is not the entire people. 
Xanana is only an inhabitant of East Tim or.' 
Lastly, he reaffirmed his belief that a 
referendum in East Timor would be the best 
solution. 
Priests surrender instructions 
Bishop Belo did, however, issue a letter on 
19 December giving priests precise 
instructions on how to act if guerrillas 
surrendered at churches. Only parish 
pastors and assistant priests could accept the 
surrenderee and they would have to make 
sure that the guerrilla was giving him or 
herself up voluntarily. Surrenderings could 
be made at any parish, and an official report 
should be made and signed by the priest 
and the military commander. 
The bishop's letter appealed to civil and 
military officals to respect human dignity, 
to treat guerillas humanely and to avoid 
forcing them into decisions against their 
will. 
There have been few independent reports 
of individuals taking advantage of the offer. 
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